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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to examine the differences and similarities in housing policies in 
the four Latin American countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. The article 
uses the welfare regime approach, modified by a recognition of path dependence, to 
identify a number of phases that each country has passed through. However,  attention 
is drawn to the substantial differences in the circumstances in each country and the ex-
tent and duration of the different phases. It is concluded that it can be beneficial to use 
the concept of a Latin American housing regime, but that this general picture has to be 
used with an understanding of the path dependence caused by the different context in 
the individual countries.  
Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to examine differences and similarities in housing policies in the 
four Latin American countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. It is argued that 
there are considerable similarities in the forms that housing policy has taken at different 
times, although the variation of context in each country and the force of path depen-
dence of different institutional and social structures have meant that singularities in the 
shape and extent of policy have varied between countries.  
The most used framework for examining housing policies in different countries is the 
welfare regimes approach pioneered by Esping-Andersen (1990). He argued that coun-
tries varied in their housing and welfare policies because of political choices that were 
made, and that countries could be grouped into different regime types on the basis of 
the political ideologies that drove these choices. He identified social democratic, con-
servative and liberal typologies of countries in the developed world of Europe and the 
Anglo-Saxon nations of Australia and the USA. His typologies have been extended to 
cover changing Eastern Europe (Clapham, 1995) and East Asian countries such as Japan 
(Ronald, 2007). However, we are not aware of any work applying the approach to Latin 
American countries. Therefore, in this paper we apply the framework to four Latin 
American countries of Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. The aim is to identify simi-
larities and differences between housing policies in these countries and to assess the 
impact of these policies on the housing situation. 
Before applying the welfare regime framework it is necessary to identify some criticisms 
and refinements of the basic approach. The first criticism concerns the perceived over-
generalisation of the similarities between countries in the same regime typology. The 
categories hide distinctiveness between countries and there is an understanding that 
these may be as important as the similarities that form the basis of the categorisation. 
Therefore, categorisation has to be seen as a blunt tool and used carefully. This criticism 
has led to an understanding of path dependence as an important factor in the develop-
ment of state policies (Malpass, 2011; Bengtsson and Ruonavaara, 2010). In other words, 
the existing structures of institutions and practices in any country frame the unique na-
ture of the housing system and influence its direction of travel and the particular shape 
that change takes. This links to another criticism of the welfare regimes approach, 
which is that it lacks a focus on change. It is argued (Clapham, 2006) that there are 
some general forces, such as globalisation, that are moving housing systems in similar 
directions and, therefore, the welfare regimes are constantly being changed. The inter-
play of globalisation with path dependence shapes the forms and outcomes of housing 
policies in individual countries and we will use this framework to examine the four Latin 
American countries of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia. The aim is to answer ques-
tions such as; are there enough similarities to talk of a Latin American regime type?  Are 
the countries moving in a similar direction and what part does path dependence play in 
the shape of change and the impact of the policies?  The remainder of this introduction 
sets the general context for the discussion of housing policies in the next section.     
Historically, Argentina, Brazil and Chile share the legacy of military governments that 
have scarred the political scene and influenced the welfare systems of their countries. 
Colombia on the other hand, has not encountered military rule on the scale of the oth-
ers , but has suffered and indeed still suffers, from more than 50 years of internal civil 1
 There was a coup d’état in 1953 but democracy was restored in 1958 (Arismenedi, 1983). For a 1
review of authoritarian tendencies and their roots in Latin America see Collier (1978).
conflict against illicit drug trafficking. The four countries are of very different popula-
tion sizes with the population of Brazil being over 200 million and Chile having just over 
17 million with Colombia and Argentina having between 40 and 50 million people. The 
rate of population growth is declining in all countries, although at a slower rate in 
Colombia than in the other three. Gross domestic product (GDP) per head is highest in 
Chile and Argentina, with Colombia being the poorest country with a GDP per head of 
half that of those two and substantially below that of Brazil and of the Latin American 
average (Table 1).  
Table 1.   
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean  - Estimates 
based on official sources - http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/
Portada.asp 
In reflection of its relatively low economic standing, Colombia has approximately twice 
the unemployment of the other three countries. All of the countries have internationally 
high levels of inequality as measured by the Gini co-efficient. With the US as a compara-
tor as a very unequal developed country with a co-efficient of .41 in 2011 (the higher 
the co-efficient the more unequal the country) Colombia has a co-efficient of .54, Brazil 
.53, Chile .51, and Argentina .44 (World Bank, 2015) 
(Dollars per inhabitant at current prices)
~ Years
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Argentina
9505.5 11509
.0
13762
.0
14730
.2
14767.
1
Brazil
8374.2 10981
.3
12583
.9
11334
.8
11220.
1
Chile
10119.4 12686
.2
14506
.5
15263
.2
15738.
5
Colombia
5085.0 6179.
3
7122.
5
7758.
0
7822.7
Latin America and the Caribbean
7196.7 8561.
5
9803.
5
9705.
1
9845.7
Latin America
7185.5 8561.
7
9811.
2
9710.
1
9850.5
The Caribbean
8131.0 8539.
5
9154.
4
9277.
4
9438.6
The countries differ on the political classification presented by political scientist Jorge 
Castañeda (2006) who argues that there are two ‘left’ political forces in Latin America: 
the ‘reconstructed left’ a fusion of communist, socialist and Castroist tendencies, which 
has evolved by learning from past mistakes and intends to develop new policies that can 
keep the region as an important player in the global market; and the ‘populist left’ 
which has a deep attachment to nationalism and tends to be anti-globalisation (Cas-
tañeda, 2006, p.34-35). There is also the centre and the centre-right that dominated 
the scene during the 1990s. This political division is reflected in the way societies and 
governments have reacted to the situation in which the countries have found them-
selves. 
Following Castañeda’s political spectrum, the four countries covered here demonstrate 
different political control over time. Argentina, representing the ‘populist left’, has 
seen the coalition of mostly socialist parties (Frente para la Victoria) win successive 
elections since 2003; the same year that Brazil, representing a ‘tenuously reconstructed 
left’ (Castañeda, 2006, p.35), saw the rise of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (workers 
party) who are also still in power. Chile, a straight ‘reconstructed left’, has followed 
this tendency for almost two decades and after a short period with the centre-right 
(2010-2014), has recently returned to where it previously was, with a newly formed 
coalition of leftist parties known as Nueva Mayoría. The exception here is Colombia that 
has been mostly moving from the right to the centre-right, with the Unidad Nacional 
coalition currently in power. Therefore, the selected countries represent a spectrum of 
different political approaches that have been applied to housing policy. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the political differences do not seem to be reflected in the re-
sources devoted to housing policy in the four countries. Brazil’s ‘tenuously reconstruct-
ed left’ has been the highest spending of the countries with Chile’s ‘reconstructed left’ 
the lowest [Table 2]. Colombia’s right wing governments have devoted more public 
spending to housing than in Chile, but less than the other two countries. However, the 
differences in spending seem to reflect differences in housing conditions rather than po-
litical differences, with Chile having the lowest proportion of slums in its urban housing 
and Brazil the highest [Table 3].  
Table 2.  
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean  - Estimates based 
on official sources - http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Porta-
da.asp 
Table 3. Urban population living in slums  
Source: United Nations Statistics Division - Millennium Indicators Database. - http://
mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx.  
All four countries have suffered from long-standing housing shortages and low rates of 
new construction, with a high rate of informal housing being a major consequence of 
this. Informal housing is found in both the ownership and in the rental sector, which is 
characterised by individual landlords, often living in the same property, and by informal 
letting practices, despite state controls on rents and tenants’ rights in the formal sector. 
HOUSING
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Country
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1
201
2
201
3
Argentina 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 ... ... ... ...
Brazil 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.6 ... ... ... ...
Chile 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 ...
Colombia 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 ...
(Percentage of urban population)
~
Year
s
Country 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2009 2012
Argentina 30.5 31.7 32.9 26.2 23.5 20.8
Brazil 36.7 34.1 31.5 29.0 28.0 26.9
Chile ... ... ... 9.2* ... ... 7.1
Colombia 31.2 26.8 22.3 17.9 16.1 14.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 33.7 ... 29.2 ... ... 23.5
Updated data to 11/SEP/2013
Colombia stands out in that a third of households are in the rented sector, with much 
smaller proportions in the other three countries. In all four, the incidence of renting 
tends to rise with income. In other words there are fewer low-income households rent-
ing and there is a tail-off amongst the highest income groups, with the highest incidence 
being amongst those in the middle range of incomes (Blanco, Cibils and Muñoz, 2014).  
Home ownership is the predominant tenure in all four countries. Colombia has the low-
est rate of ownership with 50 per cent and Brazil the highest with 75 per cent. Argentina 
and Chile have between 65 and 70 per cent (Blanco, Cibils and Munoz, 2014). Home 
ownership has been encouraged by governments in all the countries, with state subsidies 
being primarily directed towards this tenure, both in new build and in the upgrading of 
existing (often informal) slum properties. Even directly provided state housing is usually 
sold to the new occupants through the provision of state subsidies and loans in addition 
to those provided by the private sector. In all countries there have been problems of the 
affordability of housing not just in the lowest income sectors and as we shall see, much 
state aid has been aimed at allowing middle-income groups to afford the ownership of 
new housing (Blanco, Cibils and Muñoz, 2014).       
This review will present a comparative description of housing policies that have been 
pursued in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia during the past five decades. The in-
formation presented is collected from official documents, government as well as in-
ternational organisations, peer reviewed academic journals and latest media articles 
from the national press of each country. The collected literature is in Spanish, Por-
tuguese and English. The description will be divided into three phases that all countries 
considered here experienced to varying degrees and at different times.  
First phase: Spread of informality and Accruing Social Housing debt 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, housing policies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colom-
bia were fashioned to meet the demand of those in formal employment.  As a conse2 -
 The literature on housing policies for these countries is quite vast, the most relevant for this period 2
are: for Argentina, Zanetta, 2005; Barreto y Alcala, 2008; Barreto, 2013; Brazil see Valladares, 
1978; Andrade and Azevedo, 1982; Melo, 1992; Bonduik, 1998; Chile see Arellano, 1982; Collins, 
1995, Kusnetzoff, 1987, Rojas, 1999; Silva Lerda, 1997, and for Colombia see Ceballos Ramos and 
Saldarriaga Roa, 2008b, Cuervo and Jaramillo, 2009. 
quence most authors agree that these housing policies failed to target the unemployed 
and those working in informal or casual jobs. This, at the time, was a considerable fail-
ure given that the informal sector counted for more than 60 per cent of the population 
(Silva Lerda, 1997). One consequence of this failure was an increase in informal housing, 
which stimulated governments’ policies of slum clearance and relocation of informal set-
tlements. Slum clearance was also motivated by a belief, particularly among military 
governments, that the situation of the unemployed would reach breaking point, forcing 
them to join and be eventually absorbed into the formal economy. There was also the 
belief that Marxist activists as well as drug cartels were infiltrating informal settle-
ments, using them as a focus of resistance, indoctrinating residents and recruiting the 
young into their networks. For these reasons governments tended to ignore social poli-
cies designed to improve conditions in informal areas and continued with slum clearance 
programmes.  
In Chile, the military government imposed strict controls over the expansion of informal 
settlements which generated another problem when the allegados, the family’s relations 
and friends, arrived to share already occupied houses, adding the problem of overcrowd-
ing to urban environments already in dire need of infrastructure development (Rojas, 
1999). In Argentina, new laws were passed with the clear intention of discouraging in-
formal settlements on the boundaries of existing urban settlements. The Ley 8912 of 
1977 classifies the periphery of Buenos Aires for recreational use and non-permanent 
residence, and specifically refers to country clubs (second holiday homes) as the pre-
ferred land use for the area (art.7).  3
The state in these countries was at this time the main provider of subsidised housing, 
responsible for the financing, planning and delivery of the projects. Institutions involved 
were usually a national mortgage bank and a relevant government institution at national 
level that coordinated all actors (local governments, construction companies and bene-
ficiaries). The schemes delivered by these institutions were generally low-cost, mass-
produced housing units with very little infrastructure, and provided mainly for sale. The 
largest example of a housing estate built during the 1970s in Latin America is located in 
Sao Paulo and has 84 housing blocks, 5 storeys high, with no public transport, a problem 
 Gobierno de Buenos Aires, Legislación, Decreto-Ley 8912/77 available at http://www.gob.gba.3 -
gov.ar/legislacion/legislacion/d-8912.html also see a Thuillier, G. (2005). 
that has not yet been adequately solved, taking today’s residents a whole two hours 
commuting to reach the city centre (Budds et. al. 2005).  
The landscape of the 1970s and 1980s was therefore of increasing informal settlements 
and insufficient and low quality housing stock. In addition, given high levels of inflation, 
most state owned mortgage banks were running large deficits and there were allegations 
of corruption in the system (see Valenca, 1992; Zavaletta, 2005; Tachopulos Sierra, 2008 
and for a more positive view on the state’s abilities to finance social housing pro-
grammes see Cuervo and Jaramillo, 2009). 
Second Phase: Adoption of the Washington Consensus 
 
All four countries share the adoption during the 1990s of very important economic rec-
ommendations known as the Washington Consensus based on a neo-liberal ideology 
(World Bank, 1993 and 1994; Gilbert 2002; Stiglitz, 2002). Broadly speaking this implied 
the reduction of the state, decentralisation, privatisation, opening of markets, and 
deregulation. The adoption of these recommendations has had a direct impact on social 
and housing policies.  
Chile had an earlier start towards liberalisation of markets than the other countries con-
sidered here as some of the recommendations of the Washington consensus were already 
underway in the country after the military coup of 1973 (Arellano, 1982; Rojas, 2000; 
Guilbert, 2002, MINVU, 2004, de Soto and Torche, 2004, Garcia de Freitas and Cunha, 
2013). Among wider economic aims, the reform intended to attract more private in-
vestment and enable the housing market to work more efficiently, with the hope that 
the housing deficit in all sectors of the population could be solved by private investment 
with the Chilean State acting as a facilitator. But as the Ministerio de Vivienda y Urban-
ismo (MINVU) (2004) explains, the reform took some time to develop and get estab-
lished. Furthermore, some even claim that its visible results only arrived with the return 
of democracy in 1990 (Rojas, 2000). Notwithstanding, the World Bank (WB) praised the 
market conditions of Chile in the early 1990s stating that the country had been able to 
provide three key elements in its housing programme: a) specific targeting of the poor, 
b) transparency and c) private market provision (World Bank, 1993). 
Socio-economic conditions, and the concomitant government expenditure devoted to 
housing subsidies, more than politics, drove the subsidised system in all countries under 
study here; therefore bringing divergences in terms of the percentage of the units that 
were subsidised and availability of credit, which depended on the value of the house. 
There were also differences on eligibility of applicants according to their minimum 
salaries (Gilbert, 1997; Chiape de Villa, 1999, Budds et al, 2005; Zanetta, 2005). But re-
gardless of the particular socio-economic conditions, the system generally consisted of a 
government subsidy that was added to the families’ savings while loans from private 
banks completed the cost. 
This structure of provision was the result of the dissemination of new ideas developed in 
the 1960s and 1970s by the architect John Turner who spent time in Peru and other Latin 
American countries studying informal developments. Turner found that households im-
proved their houses incrementally (Turner, 1977). He argued that their self-help ap-
proach was better than the large scale schemes developed so far by the governments 
and that a system of progressive building based on families’ savings was better suited to 
solve the housing deficit particularly for the very poor. His ideas were popularised 
around the mid 1990s as well as those of others with similar views on self-build solutions 
(Pugh, 1990; for a criticism of Turner see Werlin, 1999). Site-and-services schemes that 
originated after these theories intended to provide serviced land to poor families (or 
group of families) that had a plan (or community plan) and were able to build with tech-
nical support from the municipality. Help was provided on condition that benefited fami-
lies would send their children to school and thus break the poverty cycle. 
All countries under study here implemented this form of incremental or progressive 
building or upgrading schemes of some sort as part of their subsidised programmes. 
Nearly twenty years later, current reviews of those past programmes are mixed. Some 
claim that municipalities did not welcome upgrading programmes as they doubted they 
could collect service charges from very poor families, therefore the investment in in-
frastructure was unlikely to be recovered. This had the effect that municipalities and 
sometimes the government themselves either restricted available land for these projects 
or rejected them altogether (Gilbert, 1997; Budds et al, 2005). Others argue that the 
progressive building strategy lent itself to abuse as it was just an excuse to deliver low 
quality unfinished units (Chiape de la Villa, 1999). Positive views of upgrading informal 
housing and site-and-service plans show that the scheme has been more successful at 
targeting the very poor than the massive new built complexes, as in the former, the 
beneficiaries own their houses outright with no mortgage, while the latter represents a 
burden in terms of repeated rent payments (Gilbert, 1997; Rojas, 1999; Green and Ortl-
ber, 2002; Boldarini, 2008). Nevertheless, at the end of the 1990s and for reasons that 
still need to be researched, the four countries studied here have tended to favour the 
delivery of new homes, whilst reducing progressively subsidies towards other alterna-
tives such as slum upgrading.  
Whatever the programme, be it progressive building, site-and-services or upgrading, the 
mechanism whereby the state helped to subsidise the demand prevailed. This was a ma-
jor change in countries that had traditionally relied on the national governments for the 
supply of social housing. Understandably, new procedural issues emerged as changes be-
came operational. One of the major challenges was how to create a more attractive 
market for the private sector. Two main barriers had to be addressed: the reduction in 
planning bureaucracy, and the legalisation of land titles (Borja and Castells, 2002; 
Cuenya, 2005; Barreto, 2013). The way to reduce bureaucracy was to decentralise activ-
ities, which in Latin America at the time was complicated as provincial governments 
were dependent on the national state with a highly centralised administrative system. 
On the other hand, capital cities had always been under suspicion that they were too 
independent from their governments.  A fine balance needed to be achieved between 4
relinquishing central powers to the provinces and strengthening their capacity to take 
new functions, while keeping metropolitan areas under control.  
Not surprisingly, the process has received severe criticism in all four countries under 
study here. Some argue that the decentralisation was heavily politicised and that power 
was given to provinces in exchange for political support to pursue wider reforms (Coy 
and Polit, 2002; Zanetta, 2005); as stated in the introduction, all countries were simul-
taneously undergoing an extensive programme of privatisation of their national in-
frastructure networks and services, and support from local government was needed to 
 This is still a current problem. The cases of Bogota and Buenos Aires are paradigmatic as they 4
have a history of being ruled by the opposition party to the national government. See Rodriguez-
Acosta, and Rosenbaum, 2005; de Duren, 2006; Thibert and Osorio,2014). 
implement these changes. Other critics of the decentralisation process focus on the lack 
of co-ordinated action at government level and particularly the unregulated public-pri-
vate interaction, which fragmented the industry sector. Small construction companies, 
for example, preferred to lobby for work with local governments while large firms pre-
ferred communication with higher levels of government (Cuenya, 2005). Unavoidably, 
this often led to a duplication of actions (Budds, et al, 2005; Rodriguez-Acosta and 
Rosenbaum, 2005). However, when subsidies were kept centralised in order to control 
activities, critics claimed that the power of the municipalities (who were in a better 
place to asses local needs), were being curtailed (Chiape de Villa, 1999, Tachópulos Sier-
ra, 2008).  
Not only was the process of decentralisation fostering discontent, but the effect of le-
galisation of land titles also started to be questioned. This was mainly because, even if a 
family managed to succeed in dealing with the bureaucracy involved in obtaining the ti-
tle, the inability of many to pay land tax duties meant that they could be dispossessed 
by the government for non-payment; which was seen as a worse situation than before 
when they had at least a ‘perceived’ ownership of the land (see Van Gelder 2009 for a 
discussion of titling theories). Also it was argued that even poor families who had ob-
tained legal titles and who had undergone the lengthy process of obtaining the subsidies 
were then refused credit by the banks (Varley, 1987, Gilbert, 1994, Van Gelder, 2009; 
Curevo and Jaramillo, 2009). Finally, the subsidies themselves were deemed unsustain-
able. In Brazil, the 1990s was a decade dominated by high inflation, which did not offer 
stable conditions for the private sector, nor for government subsidies which could quick-
ly reduce in real terms (Azevedo, 2007; Valenca, 2001; Fonseca, 1998; Morais,Saad Filho 
and Coelho, 1999; Valenza, 1998; Valeza and Bonates, 2009). In Argentina most of the 
subsidised housing projects were delivered by NGOs as the government was unable to 
create sustainably priced mortgages (Murillo, 2001). In Colombia the lengthy process of 
mortgage applications (usually over ten months) combined with the housing boom creat-
ed by these very same programmes, meant that by the time candidates managed to 
gather all necessary funds (savings + subsidy + credit), the dwelling or plot of land of 
their choice was out of reach (Gilbert, 1997, Chiape de Villa, 1999). 
But the biggest failure for all countries was that, despite the promises of targeting the 
very poor, those with no access to formal jobs were unable to benefit from any of the 
plans. Even in Chile targeting the very poor proved difficult despite the system being 
heavily subsidised by the government (Gilbert, 1997; Rojas, 1999). Furthermore, as Ro-
jas suggests, much of what was achieved in terms of attracting the private sector, was 
possible due to the country’s own economic success (increased consumer confidence and 
rising in interest rates - all beneficial conditions for the private sector). The fragility of 
the system became evident at the end of the 1990s when unstable economic conditions 
generated an increase in mortgage interest rates that saw the collapse of many pro-
grammes and institutions across all countries other than Chile. Unavoidably, when trans-
ferring the so-called Chilean model to other countries with larger housing deficits and 
thousands living informally hoping for subsidies, bigger challenges emerged. Towards the 
turn of the century, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia had to divert subsidy funds to sup-
port the administration of an increasing demand, making administrative costs larger in 
proportion to the spend (Gilbert, 1997; Chiape de Villa, 1999; Tachcpulos Sierra, 2008; 
Cuervo and Jaramillo, 2009). Still a decade later some argue that the financial condi-
tions at the time were not mature enough to attract institutional investors capable of 
providing private funding for housing programmes, let alone provide a solution for the 
lowest income sector of the population as was claimed by the World Bank (Soto and 
Torche, 2004, Zanetta, 2005). 
During the late 1990s, local authorities in Colombia were requested to develop a strate-
gy plan (Ley de desarrollo Territorial 388, 1997-still in force) . New municipal funds 5
were also created (Fondos Municipales de Vivienda de Interés Social), with the aim of 
collecting and managing revenues for social housing programmes. While the strategy 
plan allows municipalities to identify land for social housing, the municipal funds equip 
them with regulations to pursue development contributions from the private sector. This 
is done either by the demand of land for social housing from the land-owner, or by a de-
velopment levy paid by developers (Chiape de Villa, 1999, Tachchlla, Sierra, 2008). 
However, there are concerns that the regulation is not fully enforced (Carrira Barrero, 
2008) and that municipalities produce a plan just to comply with the national law. 
The 1990s ended with successive economic crises that affected the largest economies in 
the region. In Colombia mortgage rates increased from 6 per cent to 20 per cent in the 
year 2000 (Cuervo and Jarmillo, 2009). The national government had to introduce a very 
 Alcaldía de Bogota Ley 388, 1997 http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?5
i=339#0
controversial new tax to help the banks cope with defaults. The National Institute of So-
cial Housing and Urban Reform (INURBE) went into liquidation by decree, this was due to 
the high administrative costs to keep the institution functioning which now coupled with 
the economic crisis, made the situation unsustainable. A new institution was created 
(Fondo Nacional de Vivienda -Fonvivienda). This national housing fund was to act as a 
facilitator and channel the resources of the new plan initiated in 2002 which looked 
again (similar to previous plans) at decentralising activities as a solution (Escobar, 2001; 
Tachipulos Sierra, 2008). 
It took Chile nearly twenty years to adapt to the economic reforms introduced in the 
1970s. Argentina, Brazil and Colombia attempted to take that leap in a few years (late 
1980s and early 1990s), with mixed reviews on the consequences of these reforms (Cas-
tañeda, 2006; Stiglitz, 2007, and for a positive impact see McKenzie and Mookheriee, 
2003). Lack of transparency in the privatisation process and the lack of a mature institu-
tional framework capable of dealing with the sophistication that international private 
investment demands have together been blamed for the economic crises that affected 
the region after market liberalisation: starting with Mexico’s Tequila crisis in 1994, 
Brazil’s hyper-inflation crisis of 1999, and ending with Argentina’s default crisis in 2001 
(Stiglitz, 2007).  
Third Phase: Building Your Way out of Recession 
In this phase all countries intended to target the very poor. The Colombian government 
launched the 100,000 Viviendas Gratis plan (free houses plan) in 2012 . The beneficia6 -
ries were families that suffered from environmental disasters or during the drug traffick-
ing wars. This new scheme was a last attempt to target the elusive bottom of the pyra-
mid, i.e. the very poor families, and follows World Bank recommendations, constituting 
a very different approach to the World Bank’s previous view when free housing provision 
was seen as dangerous as it could induce larger rural-urban migration, straining the 
cities even more (Pugh, 1990).  
 Gobierno de Colombia, Haciendo Casas Cambiamos Vidas. 100,000 Viviendas Gratis http://6
www.100milviviendasgratis.gov.co/publico/Default.aspx 
In Brazil, the worker housing provision was for a large scale subsidy programme through 
the Programme Minha Casa Minha Vida (PMCMV) . There are claims that this was mainly 7
driven by the construction sector (Arantes and Fix, 2009; Macedo, 2010; Cardoso et al, 
2011). There are also problems with quality (Kowaltowslki et al, 2006) with some critics 
stating that if customers had a choice by being able to buy a non-subsidised home, the 
whole scheme and the construction companies that benefitted from it would be out of 
business (Formoso et al, 2011).  
After the default in 2001, Argentinian construction companies restructured considerably. 
But in 2012 the National Government launched a new plan (Plan Pro. Cre. Ar)  which of8 -
fers 400,000 subsidised mortgages to working families. The first phase of the plan ran 
until 2014. The subsidy is for progressive building or new homes. In common with the 
plans in other countries, the plan aims to increase growth in the economy through the 
construction sector, but unlike Colombia’s new homes, the programme, Pro.Cre.Ar still 
misses the bottom of the pyramid as it only targets those in employment. Furthermore, 
the plan relies on the state, provinces and municipalities to make land available for new 
developments, which strains already cash-poor municipal authorities, which can only 
comply by providing low-cost peripheral land rather than in the centre of the cities 
where people prefer to be for employment reasons. 
But there are other problems related to the use of state land for social housing pro-
grammes. Chile, which pioneered the subsidy system, also relies on state land for its 
current MINVU programmes. Indeed, rising land prices and the failure of the system to 
impose stricter regulations on developers means that the State is the main provider of 
the sites for social housing (Brain and Sabatini, 2006). As these authors suggest, in-
creased construction costs are also part of the problem, and given that the subsidies 
have a cap, the only solution to keep developing social housing is by building on state 
land; making the authors speculate on the possibility that the state is undervaluing sites 
in order to complete politically charged projects to win more votes. 
 Regulatory framework of the programme can be found at the Ministry of Cities http://www.7 -
cidades.gov.br/index.php/minha-casa-minha-vida.html
 Decree 902/2012 Boletín Oficial Available at http://procrear.anses.gob.ar/documentos/decre8 -
to-procrear.pdf
Conclusions 
The above discussion highlights the similarities in the trajectories of housing policy in 
the four countries of Latin America studied here. Each of the countries has passed 
through three phases, the first one that was characterised by governments’ lack of re-
sponse to the housing problem and subsequent spread of infomrality and accruing of so-
cial housing debt. A second phase when all governments under study adopted the Wash-
ington Consensus and intended to attract bank financing to help reduce the housing cri-
sis. A third phase mainly led by the construction sector which saw the delivery of poor 
quality homes in peripheral locations.  
All these three stages happened at different times and to differing extents in all four 
countries under study here. Variations in the socio-economic and political conditions and 
the institutional context have meant that the general trends have taken different shapes 
in the four countries and this is reflected in the outcomes achieved. Nevertheless the 
similarities mean that it is possible to use the concept of a Latin American housing 
regime for the four countries considered here - experiences are discernibly different 
from the patterns in other countries and regime types. However, the adoption of this 
approach should not lead to a disregard of the path dependent differences between the 
countries that have been highlighted in this paper. 
 
The review has shown the outcomes of previous policies and the problems encountered. 
In all four countries there are still considerable shortages of housing and problems of af-
fordability. Criticisms have pointed to the lack of focus of policies and programmes on 
the lowest income groups. This is partly an issue of political choice, but also reflects the 
problems associated with the adoption of ownership as the predominant model. There 
have been calls for the encouragement of a rental housing sector (see Blanco, Cibils and 
Muñoz, 2014) that would be more attuned to the requirements of those on low and un-
stable incomes and so could cater for the poorest sectors of the population. In addition 
rental housing can be provided at high densities and in the centre of cities and so con-
tribute towards employment and environmental objectives. If rental housing is to be 
provided through the private sector there needs to be a review of current rent control 
and tenancy regulation policies to enable landlords to generate an acceptable rate of 
return and tenants and landlords to have a legal framework that meets their needs.  
The extent of inequality in the countries studied here means that the distribution of 
housing is certain to be a major problem without extensive state aid for the lowest in-
come groups. Efforts to meet the housing needs of the poorest sections of the popula-
tions have had mixed results and no country has been able to devise and implement a 
sustainable programme that meets the needs of the lowest income people. The failure 
may partly reflect the dominance of the ownership paradigm and partly the failure to 
capture contributions from developers to supplement scarce public subsidy.  
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